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ABSTRACT
This article aims to evaluate the relations between law and logic concerning the particular 
aspect of the creation of a norm. It is commonly accepted among lawyers that the “new” 
norm is generated via a practical syllogism, constituted by a general norm and the cor-
responding fact as premises, generating as the conclusion the individual norm regarding 
that fact, for instance:  “You should follow your promises”, “This is a promise of yours”, 
“Therefore, you should follow this promise”. While the validity of such an argument is evi-
dent, there is, surprisingly, no logical justification for the application of the rule of inference 
to norms (which are not true or false). This is a philosophical puzzle named after Jørgen 
Jørgensen, coined by Alf Ross in the 1940s, which in the 1970s received an original answer 
from the jurist Hans Kelsen, based on the notion of a “modally indifferent substrate”. With 
this notion, Kelsen intends to show that the abovementioned dilemma is actually an illusion. 
Our aim is to show that Kelsen’s treatment only solves the issue at the legal normative level; 
the problem still remains on a moral normative level and concerning regular imperatives.
Keywords: legal philosophy, logic, morals, Jørgensen’s dilemma, Hans Kelsen.
Introduction
The relation between the fields of logic and law is confirmed by a long history of connec-
tions that appear to originate in the Roman law tradition. The confluences that were e ablished, 
together with the many conflicts still to be solved from both per ectives, led to the e ablishment 
of a third field, namely, legal philosophy. This hybrid discipline collects concepts from both orig-
inal fields and deals with the theoretical problems that neither of them can—separately—give a 
full and convenient treatment. One of these “unsolved problems” is the following philosophical 
“puzzle”: if we accept that legal or moral norms cannot be treated like common true/false state-
ments, then they cannot be part of the so-called pra ical syllogisms, like those considering deci-
sion-making. It remains that we tend to accept as valid arguments of the follows type:
(1) Every Brazilian citizen must pay her taxes.
(2) I am a Brazilian citizen.
(3) Therefore, I must pay my taxes.
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Not only does this argument seem to be valid, but the 
truth of the conclusion seems to be inevitable, once we agree 
with the premises. But, if we cannot treat imperatives (1) and 
(3) as regular propositions like (2), then the argument cannot 
be the object of propositional logic. 
This puzzle was pointed out by Jørgen Jørgensen in 
1937, and was afterwards named after him—by Alf Ross in 
1944. Both authors attempted to provide a solution to the 
problem, albeit unsuccessfully. Later, in 1979, Hans Kelsen 
offered a solution based on his concept of a modally indif-
ferent substrate (henceforward to be designated as “MIS”). 
According to him, the MIS is the content of the norm, 
which is not itself true nor false, but can only get “dressed 
up” in the prescriptive mode—when it constitutes a valid 
norm—or in the descriptive mode—when it constitutes a 
true or false statement.
In the following sections, we aim to take possession of 
the Kelsenian concept of MIS in order to introduce a revised 
conception of the deontic logic approach, based on the philo-
sophical commitment according to which Kelsen’s solution to 
the dilemma actually only prevails on a juridical level, so that 
the dilemma still remains unsolved when dealing with moral 
norms or simple imperatives or commands. Our criticism of 
Kelsen’s approach will indicate that the problem of the prac-
tical syllogism is still an open question in the field of pra ical 
philosophy. 
Jørgensen’s Dilemma
Deontic logic, as proposed by von Wright (1951), does 
not give a sufficient account of the legal consequences of deal-
ing with norms in a “mechanical” manner. Given the narrow 
scope of the logical treatment of juridical prescriptions, authors 
like Hans Kelsen felt motivated to explain the dynamics of the 
legal field without trespassing the limits of the “purely” juridi-
cal scope. Kelsen was famous for demanding a “pure” theory of 
Law (1989 [1960]), attacking the introduction of any element 
coming from outside the legal domain in order to explain le-
gal procedures and legal concepts. Kelsen even denies that the 
notion of “justice” has any relevance for the definition of what 
a legal norm is, for instance. This fact has attra ed a lot of crit-
icism, in particular concerning the methods of legal positivism 
as they were applied by Kelsen. But here we should notice that 
an important consequence for the Kelsenian “purist” view is the 
denial of logic as a means for the application of law. Let us try to 
understand what this means for us here.
According to legal positivism, the creation of a particular 
norm for a  ecific case in a court is actually the application of 
a general norm written down in a formal document such as a 
statute or a Constitution, for example. Only the Law itself can 
generate legal norms. The justification for normative validity 
(the validity of a norm is the very existence of such a norm 
in the legal system; it’s the notion indicating that the norm is 
binding for its addressees, and has nothing to do with logical 
validity) is based on the existence of a prior, more general, al-
ready valid norm. This process, even if it faces some internal 
problems,2 preserves the methodological commitment to the 
purity of legal theory.
Following the process of justification, what happens in 
the court when a case is judged could be represented by a 
structure very similar to what Aristotle called a pra ical syl-
logism. For Aristotle, there was no important difference be-
tween a pra ical and a theoretical syllogism. Let us observe 
the explanation given by Broadie (1968, p. 26): 
In De Anima 434a15–20 Aristotle says of 
the practical syllogism: ‘The one premise or 
judgment is universal and the other deals 
with the particular (for the first tells us that 
such and such a kind of man should do such 
and such a kind of act, and the second that 
this is an act of the kind meant, and I am a 
person of the type indicated).’ We are not 
in this passage given a description of the 
conclusion of the practical syllogism; but 
it is clear from several passages, (e.g. De 
Motu Animalium 701a28–33 and Nic. Eth. 
1147a25–30), that the conclusion is to be 
construed as an action. For example, in De 
Motu 701a20–24 Aristotle writes ‘I need a 
covering and a cloak is a covering, I need a 
cloak. What I need, I ought to make; I need 
a cloak, I ought to make a cloak. And the 
conclusion ‘I ought to make a cloak’ is an 
action. […] That the action is the conclusion 
is quite clear’.
The problem of the logical treatment of imperatives has 
evolved since von Wright, and can be more efficiently an-
swered by adopting other, more refined and formally devel-
oped “versions” of logic. However, legal norms are not simple 
imperatives. The bidingness of a legal norm cannot be gra ed 
by any logical tools currently at hand. This was precisely the 
obstacle noticed by von Wright (1957, p. vii) himself: 
Another application is to the logical study 
of the norms (normative discourse). This 
latter study is important to ethics and the 
philosophy of law. But it must be pursued 
2 The process of searching for the justification of a norm’s validity has to end at some point. One might say it stops when we arrive at the 
Constitution of a country, but even the Constitution will be valid only if supported by a prior already valid norm. And as for the legislator 
of the Constitution, from where does she acquire her authority to elaborate the constitutional norms? Kelsen will answer that we should 
presuppose a higher norm, a fictive basic norm, which does not exist in the same way that ordinary norms do, but whose validity is only 
fictional. Thus, the basic norm is a methodological device to be presupposed as if it were a valid norm in order to enclose the positive 
legal system.
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with much more refinement than in my first 
paper (here republished) on deontic logic. 
Philosophically, I find this paper very unsat-
isfactory. For one thing, because it treats of 
norms as a kind of proposition which may 
be true or false. This, I think, is a mistake. 
Deontic logic gets part of its philosophic 
significance from the fact that norms and 
valuations, though removed from the realm 
of truth, yet are subject to logical law.
So, let us regard Jørgensen’s puzzle as composed of legal 
norms instead of ordinary imperatives, in order to better un-
derstand the difficulty in dealing with the rational evaluation 
of legal norms.
In the Criminal Code of Canada (1985), we read the 
following legal norm, concerning the case of abortion: “Every 
female person who, being pregnant, with intent to procure 
her own miscarriage, uses any means or permits any means to 
be used for the purpose of carrying out her intention is guilty 
of an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term 
not exceeding two years”. Exceptions to this law are detailed 
shortly after in the Code. Even if the phrase is not formulated 
as an imperative, i.e., even if it simply declares that the prac-
tice of abortion is punished by imprisonment, it does not de-
scribe a fact, but prescribes something that ought to happen 
(imprisonment) if the crime has taken place (the abortion). 
Now imagine a female person—let us call her “Laura Palm-
er”—has been accused with sufficient evidence of undergoing 
an abortion. This fact allows us to formulate the statement 
“Laura Palmer has procured her own miscarriage by an act of 
abortion.” It seems very straightforward to derive that “Laura 
Palmer ought to be sent to prison for a term not exceeding 
two years”. These three elements form our instance of a prac-
tical syllogism composed by a general norm as major premise, 
a fact as minor premise, and an individual or particular norm 
as a conclusion. 
Now we can consider why we cannot evaluate such an 
“argument” in the same way we are used to proceeding in cases 
of “regular” syllogisms. First, let us note that the general norm 
is valid for two reasons: first, because its content is based on 
the content of a more general valid norm; and second, be-
cause it was ena ed by a legal authority, namely the legislator. 
It represents what Kelsen calls the meaning of an objective 
act of will: the legislator expresses her will that something 
ought to be the case, and the positive norm is the meaning, 
the sense of that objective will. The same will happen to the 
individual norm. Its content is based on the content of the 
general norm, and it represents the meaning of the objective 
act of will of the judge. The “objectivity” is due to the fact that 
the legal authority in question has no interest in the case, it is 
a “neutral” third party.
So, if the logical rules are able to deal with the subsump-
tion demanded by the first reason explained above, there is no 
way logic can grasp and offer a treatment of the second rea-
son. There enters the methodological “purity” expressed by 
Hans Kelsen. If the pra ical syllogism could still be logically 
treated when it involves simple imperatives (where truthiness 
is artificially identified with the performance of the imper-
ative—“Close the door!” will be “fulfilled” when the door is 
closed), this still could not be achieved in the juridical level.
Actually, Jorgensen (1937) himself and Alf Ross (1944) 
after him have already tried to give an account of how the 
puzzle can be so overwhelming in the various instances of the 
pra ical syllogism. 
As Cabrera (1999, p. 207) points out, the main problem 
concerning Jørgensen’s dilemma does not concern the fact of 
deriving norms from facts (or indicative sentences), but con-
sists in logically deriving one norm from another. Jørgensen 
is aware of the impossibility of treating norms like true/false 
statements, so he will present the notions of indicative factor 
(the  ecific content of the norm, which has a proposition-
al feature, and thus may be treated with some logical tools) 
and imperative factor (the expression of the subject’s state of 
mind: the act of commanding, the act of giving an order) of 
a norm. Contrary to Kelsen’s modally indifferent substrate, 
which we will encounter below, the indicative factor can be 
perfectly treated logically, and the conditions for understand-
ing the syllogism would depend on the translation of the im-
perative factor to the indicative, where we could apply the 
rules of logic, mainly the rule of inference. Once the conclu-
sion is achieved, we could translate the statement back to its 
imperative factor, with the individual norm.
This translation would be made possible by a link be-
tween the truthiness of a statement and the verification or 
satisfa ion of the imperative. Alf Ross, however, claims that 
the logical a ect of the imperatives in the pra ical inference 
concerns not the satisfa ion or the verification, but the “sub-
jective validity” of those imperatives. In this case, says Ross 
(1944, p. 38), “[a]n imperative is said to be valid when a cer-
tain, further defined psychological state is present in a certain 
person, and to be non-valid when no such state is present”. 
That is to say that we would be able to apply the logic indi-
rectly to imperatives when in some determined intentional 
psychological state justifying or motivating the imperant’s will 
in creating the norm.
Kelsen, in turn, provides a more thorough explanation 
of why the puzzle amazes us. He says that the derivation 
seems inevitable because we are actually considering only the 
content of the norms, which he calls the modally indifferent 
substrate (MIS). The content itself is still not true or false, it is 
indifferent, something like “having an abortion”, in our above-
mentioned example. It can be “dressed up” in the normative or 
prescriptive mode when we have a valid law about abortion, 
or in the descriptive mode when we have a true/false state-
ment about abortion. In the first case, however, for the pre-
scription to be a binding valid norm, it still has to be ena ed 
by a legal authority as the meaning of her objective act of will.
The neutrality of the content with re ect to the form 
is what allows us the mobility between the two fields—is 
and ought—which are separate and isolated from each oth-
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er, as the naturalistic fallacy points out. However, the notion 
of MIS allows us a much more fluid exchange between the 
two fields, since the neutrality of the content does not work 
against the methodological abyss instantiated by the natural-
istic fallacy. In this sense we believe that a dialog can be im-
plemented between the two fields, encouraging their approx-
imations, without neglecting their mutual autonomy.
Moral Norms in 
Jorgensen’s Dilemma 
In the previous section, we saw that the “conclusion” of 
the pra ical syllogism, which in the legal context is an indi-
vidual norm, actually needs to be created or ena ed by an 
authority, more than just derived from the premises by any-
one. Kelsen provides this account of the problem in a book 
called General Theory of Norms, indicating that his positivistic 
approach must prevail not only for positive law, but also for 
positive morals or even religious systems, such as Catholicism, 
for example. Actually, most of Kelsen’s (2001 [1979], p. 254) 
examples come from a religious field:
For example: Paul comes home from school 
and says to his father: ‘My classmate Hugo 
is my enemy, I hate him.’ Thereupon, Paul’s 
father addresses an individual norm to him: 
‘You are to love your enemy Hugo and not 
hate him.’ Paul asks his father: ‘Why am I to 
love my enemy?’, that is, he asks why the 
subjective meaning of he’s father’s act of 
will is also its objective meaning, why it is 
a norm binding on him, or—and this is the 
same question—he wants to know the rea-
son for the validity of this norm. Whereupon 
his father says: ‘Because Jesus commanded 
“Love your enemies”.’ Paul then asks ‘Why 
is anyone to obey the commands of Jesus?’; 
that is, he asks why the subjective mean-
ing of Jesus’s act of will is also its objective 
meaning, why it is a valid norm, or—and 
this is the same question—what is the rea-
son for the validity of this general norm. The 
only possible answer to that is: Because as 
a Christian one presupposes that one is to 
obey the commands of Jesus.
It is precisely regarding this a ect, namely the fact that 
the positive moral field receives the same treatment as the 
positive legal field, that we attack Kelsen’s approach to the 
pra ical syllogism. We understand that the notion of MIS 
does not operate in the field of moral norms or simple imper-
atives in the same way as it does in the legal field. Therefore, 
Kelsen’s answer to Jorgensen’s dilemma only partially goes 
through (that is, it only concerns the juridical level).
Similarly to the example of the Canadian Criminal 
Code, let us now provide and analyse an example of a mor-
al pra ical syllogism. We can stick to Kelsen’s own example 
about “loving our enemies”. Then our major premise would be 
represented by the general moral norm (1) “Everyone should 
love their enemies” (to be read as “if x is my enemy, then I 
should love x”). Let the fact in question be (2) “John is my en-
emy”, which is the minor premise. Therefore, the conclusion 
has to be (3) “I should love John”. According to the procedure 
of justification of positive norms, (1) is provided by the “legis-
lator” and present in some kind of “official” document, which 
would be, re ectively, God and the Bible. Premise (2) does 
not face further problems either, since it is simply the fact un-
der consideration. Now, trouble comes with the conclusion 
(3). Since it is an individual norm, it should, more than being 
supported by (1), also be the meaning of an objective act of 
will. In law, that objective act of will comes from the figure of 
the judge, but in morals there is no neutral “third party” en-
a ing the individual norms. Each of us is responsible for the 
subsumption of the individual norm under the general moral 
norm we all understand. The act of will generating the norm 
in the conclusion is therefore always subjective.
Concerning the “objectiveness” in question, Beyleveld and 
Brownsword (1998, p. 118) make this prudent observation: 
As we understand Kelsen, he is not saying 
[…] that a norm is objectively valid (that an 
‘ought’ has an objective meaning) on con-
dition that everyone agrees that the behav-
ior prescribed ought to be done. It is not 
a consensus of wills that converts a subjec-
tive ‘ought’ into an objective ‘ought’. He is 
saying that to regard a norm as being ob-
jectively valid is (that is, means) to regard 
what the norm prescribes as binding upon 
all whose behavior (actual or potential) is 
being addressed by the norm regardless of 
whether anyone (including the person who 
is doing this objective regarding) wishes 
this behavior or not (that is, regardless of 
whether anyone wills this ‘ought’ in the sub-
jective sense).  
The definition of “norm” is indeed linked to the con-
cept of a command or an order, but with the important detail 
that this order must come from an authorised person, as an 
expression—mostly in the form of an imperative—of a will. 
Since this will must come from a person authorized by the 
law or morals itself, there is always a strict relation between 
the legal (or moral) production and the legal (or moral) pow-
er. According to Bobbio (2008), to enact a norm is always to 
be able to do so, and the authorisation comes from no one but 
the law (or morals) itself. This shows the importance of the 
fact that methodological procedures for managing relations 
between legal or moral norms, which handle a variety of pos-
sible legal or moral affairs, must always come from the system 
itself—something that also illustrates the constant concern 
with preserving the principle of “purity”.
So, the problem here is that the pra ical syllogism seems 
very much more acceptable in the moral field than in the ju-
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ridical field. The MID still explains how we move between 
fields of is and ought without falling prey to the naturalistic 
fallacy, since we are only considering the neutral content of 
norms and statements by acts of thinking, and not acts of will. 
The point is that, concerning moral norms, we are capable of 
creating our own individual norms by acts of subjective will. 
The problematic a ect is that this subjectivity will prevent 
the norm from being a valid norm, i.e., from being binding or 
obligatory for the addressee; that is, moral norms would be 
nothing more than commands, prescriptions, or orders with-
out validity (in the legal, not logical, sense of the term). This 
problem is a huge gap in Kelsen’s theory, as we can see (2001 
[1979], p. 27):
This is the only way in which the command 
of a highwayman can be distinguished from 
that of a moral or legal authority. General-
ly: not every Ought which is the meaning 
of an act of will is a binding norm. For in-
stance: I can will ‘Everyone is to marry upon 
reaching a certain age’. That is not a bind-
ing norm for there is no norm of a positive 
moral or legal order which empowers me to 
posit such a norm. The Ought in this case 
is only the subjective meaning of my act of 
will, and not its objective meaning. It is only 
when the Ought has an objective meaning, 
and so expresses a command, that there ex-
ists a duty (i.e. a binding norm).
The problem we are pointing to is: how does the individ-
ual moral norm acquire its validity if there’s no authority to 
enact an objective act of will? If we cannot answer this ques-
tion, we are not able to distinguish between a moral norm and 
an ordinary order or command. According to this view, the 
pra ical syllogism remains out of the scope of Kelsen’s treat-
ment when it involves moral norms instead of legal norms, 
and Jørgensen’s dilemma remains unsolved.
Final remarks
The main objective of this article was to compare how 
moral and legal positive norms behave in the so-called prac-
tical syllogism. The appearance of inevitability coming from 
examples of this kind of argument contrasts with the fact that 
we actually have no grounds to treat norms and imperatives 
like we treat statements, that is, according to truth values. 
This strange fact was chara erised as a philosophical puzzle, 
made famous in the name of the first author to ever notice it, 
Jørgen Jørgensen.
After Jørgensen himself and Alf Ross (Richard Hare 
also made a contribution to this discussion in 1972, but 
Kelsen demonstrated that his treatment was similar to—
and as wrong as—Jørgensen’s), Kelsen gave the most detailed 
and complete account of the problems in dealing with the 
pra ical syllogism. His approach, based on the MIS notion, 
provides a reasonable treatment of the puzzle inside the le-
gal scope, demonstrating the fact that we are able to move 
between indicative and normative fields since we are only 
considering the neutral content of norms and statements. Af-
terwards, knowing the content to be placed in the conclusion, 
we are able to “dress” this content (not translate it!) in the nor-
mative mode, thanks to an objective act of will coming from a 
legal authority, i.e., a judge.
However, in the moral field, we lack this final step. 
There is no authority to provide the validity of the individual 
moral law. In the moral field, we can say that “we are our own 
judges”, who have to evaluate the general norm according to 
the different cases we deal. Consequently, individual norms 
have no binding power, no validity, and cannot differ from a 
simple command. This represents a huge flaw in a moral the-
ory, namely not being able to differentiate a moral norm from 
an ordinary order. Another negative consequence is the fact 
that, even nowadays, the only rea ion we can have in face of 
the troublesome cases of a pra ical syllogism like Jørgensen’s 
dilemma seems to be plain rational discomfort.
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